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I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States faces an immediate and continuous threat of ter-
rorist attack using weapons of mass destruction,' including nuclear 
weapons. The intelligence function and national security law, including 
international law--or more accurately transnational law-are central to 
addressing this threat. Indeed, international law is more relevant today in 
addressing this threat than it was before September 11. 
Part II of this Article describes a continuum of contemporary threats 
to U.S. national security, with a focus on nonstate terrorism. Part III ad-· 
dresses the role of intelligence and national security law, and in 
particular law addressed to process, in combating these threats. Good 
process advances the liberty and safety interests embodied in the concept 
of national security. Good process improves the quality of decision. It 
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. He is also an adjunct 
professor at the Georgetown Law Center and the University of Iowa College of Law, where he 
teaches national security law. Previously he served as Special Assistant to the President and 
Legal Adviser to the National Security Council (1997-2000) and as Deputy Legal Advisor to 
the National Security Council (1994-1997). Baker has also served as a Marine Corps infantry 
officer, legislative aide and Chief of Staff to a U.S. Senator, as a line attorney at the Depart-
ment of State, and as Counsel to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. He is 
the author with W. Michael Reisman of REGULATING COVERT ACTION (1992). Some of the 
arguments presented in this Article are drawn from his forthcoming IN THE COMMON DE-
FENSE: NATIONAL SECURITY LAW FOR PERILOUS TIMES (Cambridge University Press, Spring 
2007) [hereinafter IN THE COMMON DEFENSE]. 
The views expressed in this Article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect 
the views of the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, the National Security Council, or any 
other governmental entity. 
I. Biological, chemical, radiological, and nuclear weapons. Of course, the United 
States, and other states, face the prospect of catastrophic attacks using other means as well. 
The September II attacks are a case in point. Consider as well the prospect of remote cyber 
attacks or the prospect that a tractor-trailer loaded with conventional dynamite can leave a 
crater 600 feet in diameter with life-threatening collateral effects reaching to 7,000 feet in 
diameter. Spencer S. Hsu & Sari Horowitz, Impervious Shield Elusive Against Drive-by Ter-
rorists, WASH. PosT, Aug. 8, 2004, at AI (citing Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 
Explosives statistics). 
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also enhances accountability, which in turn improves decision. Where 
good process is defined in law to include executive directive, it is better 
insulated from the immediate imperatives of secrecy and speed. 
Part IV addresses the relationship between the intelligence function 
and international law. Most observers, and many operatives, instinctively 
find this juxtaposition oxymoronic. However, the Part argues that trans-
national law can facilitate the intelligence function. 
Part V describes the responsibilities of the intelligence lawyer. One 
duty of the intelligence lawyer is to guide decisionmakers to lawful re-
sults. However, intelligence lawyers should also guide decisionmakers to 
preferred outcomes, based on legal policy2 and American legal values. 
These legal values, including values expressed in international law, often 
reflect good national security policy and are not just a distinguishing 
characteristic of constitutional democracy. This means that, as with intel-
ligence itself, national security law depends on the human factor-
lawyers who have the moral courage to identify and apply the law and 
legal policy in good faith. 
II. THE THREAT 
Discussion of national security law should start with discussion of 
the threat. National security law is not an abstraction, but a mechanism 
to address real threats and preserve our constitutional values while do-
ing so. Therefore, we cannot effectively address the role of 
intelligence, the role of law, and the relationship between the two with-
out defining the threat. 
Differences in legal perspective may reflect different perceptions of 
the threat and not in fact different perceptions of the law. For example, 
in the context of terrorism, the central constitutional debate involves 
the scope of the commander in chief's authority. Lawyers generally 
agree that the president not only has the constitutional authority to de-
fend the United States from attack; he has a duty to do so. However, 
active debate has centered on whether the United States is presently 
"under attack" for constitutional purposes. 
In the intelligence realm, if one believes that the United States 
faces an imminent and continuing threat of a mass casualty attack, one 
must surely favor broad and flexible intelligence authority. On the 
other hand, if one believes the threat is exaggerated, transient, or both, 
one might reasonably advocate a narrower authority, including more 
emphasis on substantive limitations, rather than procedural safeguards, 
when using the intelligence instrument. Regardless of how significant 
one perceives the threat to be, anyone who believes that national secu-
rity encompasses liberty and security values should also favor an active 
2. By legal policy, I mean prudential judgments about the application of the law, in-
cluding, for example, advice on choosing between lawful alternatives. 
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process of internal and external appraisal. Such a process of appraisal 
helps to ensure not only that intelligence actions are lawful, but also 
that they are effective and consistent with American values. 
In my view, the United States faces four immediate and potentially 
catastrophic threats, broadly defined. First is the threat of terrorist at-
tack using a weapon of mass destruction (WMD): a chemical, 
biological, or nuclear device. Second, in defending against this threat, 
the United States may take measures that degrade the quality of our 
democracy and do so permanently, because the threat from catastrophic 
terrorism is indefinite. Third, we may not agree as a society on the na-
ture of the threat and therefore the nature of the response. In failing to 
agree, we may compromise by splitting the difference when it comes to 
authority, rather than by maximizing authority and applying a propor-
tionate measure of appraisal to the use of necessary authority. In doing 
so, we may fail to fully protect against a WMD attack or to preserve 
those values that underpin both our security and our liberty. These 
same legal values are national security values, because the rule of law 
applied at home and abroad will help diminish the appeal of jihadism 
overseas. Fourth, in addressing the threat of terror and perhaps in cop-
ing with the war in Iraq, we run the risk that we will degrade our 
ability to address this century's other certain threats-nuclear prolifera-
tion, instability in the Middle East, pandemic disease, environmental 
degradation, and energy and economic rivalry. This may occur because 
we are distracted, divided, or because we are exhausted.3 
Jihadist4 terrorists have tried, and are trying, to obtain weapons of 
mass destruction. The jihadists' tactical objectives likely include the 
3. For purposes of this symposium, I have chosen to focus on the first threat; however, 
these threats are interrelated and need to be addressed in a collective and comprehensive fashion. 
4. A note on terminology: John Brennan, a former head of the CIA's Counterterrorism 
Center and the interagency Terrorist Threat Integration Center (now the National Counterter-
rorism Center), points out that linking terrorism with jihad "unwittingly transfer[s] the 
religious legitimacy inherent in the concept of jihad to murderous acts that are anything but 
holy." John Brennan, We've Lost Sight of His Vision, WASH. PosT, Feb. 26, 2006, at B4. 
The problem with the term "terrorist" is that it reaches too far, covering a genre or gener-
alized set of tactics that can describe the environmental extremist that bums down an SUV 
dealership as well as the al Qaeda operative intent on blowing up New York. Former Repre-
sentative and 9/11 Commission Vice Chairman Lee Hamilton tells the story of former Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage leaving a meeting and bemoaning that "[w]e can't 
even agree on who we are fighting." Hamilton points out that in one newspaper he counted 
eight different terms to describe the terrorist opponent, including "terrorists," "Islamists," and 
"Al-Qaeda affiliates." Lee Hamilton, Landon Lecture at Kansas State University (Mar. 
29, 2005), available at http://www.mediarelations.K-state.edu/WEB/News/NewsReleases/ 
hamiltontext305.html. 
Accepting Brennan's point, I have chosen 'jihadist" in a value-neutral manner, so as to 
delink terrorism from the adjective "Islamic." "Terrorist" falls short as well because it is too 
general a term for the focus I wish to apply to those persons, organizations, and movements 
that are committed to engaging in mass casualty incidents, potentially using WMD. "Jihadist" 
is also the term in present use by the intelligence community, as reflected in the declassified 
portions of the 2006 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE EsTI-
MATE: TRENDS IN GLOBAL TERRORISM: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES (2006). This 
report was compiled by multiple U.S. intelligence agencies and released by the House Com-
mittee on Intelligence. 
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physical destruction of New York City and Washington, D.C., and in the 
interim, the conduct of symbolic and mass casualty events. Their strate-
gic objectives likely include the erosion of democracy as a symbol of 
transitional hope in the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa, as well as 
the diminution of American cultural influence in the Islamic world. 
Terrorism, of course, is not a new threat. A counterterrorism center 
has existed at the CIA since 1986; the threat of hijacking dates from at 
least the 1960s. However, today's threat is distinct. First, terrorism today 
comes with the backdrop of nuclear weapons. The International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) has documented over 100 instances where nu-
clear material has gone missing in the past decade, with seventeen 
confirmed instances involving weapons-grade enriched uranium or plu-
tonium.5 This trend continues. Recent statements by officials at the 
Department of Homeland Security indicate that "[t]he incidents tracked 
by the department, based on its reporting and information from foreign 
diplomatic and intelligence sources, average about twice the number 
made public each year by the IAEA," and range from 200-250 incidents 
a year.6 Further, while Iran and North Korea present their own prolifera-
tion concerns, they are also a potential source of WMD for nonstate 
actors. Harvard Professor Graham Allison and others have argued that it 
does not in fact take a rocket scientist to make a nuclear weapon; it takes 
fissionable material.7 Thus, this contest is potentially about the survival 
of the state, by which I mean the survival of a process of government 
dedicated to the ideals of tolerance, due process, transparency, and free-
dom. This also means that the United Kingdom's experience with the 
IRA, for example, is useful, but it is a mistake to look back rather than 
forward in calibrating our response. 
Second, this conflict is distinct because we do not face a fixed mili-
tary opponent, but rather a threat from a variety of organizations and 
individuals unified in their hatred and their tactics. As a result, success is 
not ultimately defined militarily by territory seized and held, as in World 
War II, or necessarily through the resolution of distinct political issues. 
Moreover, the opponent does not need territory, armies, or a chain of 
command to fight this conflict. Unlike the Cold War or even World War 
II, the logic of rational deterrence against the use of WMD does not per-
tain to the nonstate jihadist. 
5. IAEA, Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB) (2003), available at www.iaea.org/ 
NewsCenter/Features/RadSources!PDF/itdb_31122003.pdf. 
6. Richard Willing, Nuclear Traffic Doubles Since '90s, USA TODAY, Dec. 26, 2006, 
at IA. 
7. GRAHAM ALLISON, NUCLEAR TERRORISM: THE ULTIMATE PREVENTABLE CATAS-
TROPHE 92-98 (2004). 
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Third, the threat is perpetual and indefinite. While the capture or 
death of the opponents' leaders and actors matters, this is not a threat 
that can be addressed through attrition alone. Only a handful of dedi-
cated individuals is necessary to sustain this threat. So long as a supply 
of WMD precursors exists in the world's arsenals, laboratories, and 
power plants, the jihadist will seek to obtain them. 
Fourth, this conflict is different because for the American public (but 
not its national security services) this is an intermittent conflict. It re-
quires inconvenience at the airport, and, for some, sorrow and fear, but to 
date it has not required societal sacrifice proportionate to the threat. In a 
2006 poll of security experts representing a spectrum of political and 
national security views, eighty-four percent responded that the United 
States would suffer a terrorist attack on the scale of September 11 within 
the next ten years.8 The public at large does not appear to share this con-
cern to the same degree. Although a degree of optimism bias may be at 
play, just as the public did not perceive a domestic threat before 9/11, the 
public may not perceive the threat to be nuclear in character. Surely, if 
the public perceived the threat as nuclear, voters and the political leaders 
they elect of both parties would not place tax breaks before implementa-
tion of a comprehensive and complete homeland security regime. Surely, 
if the public perceived the threat as nuclear and biological, we would 
more readily take concrete steps to curtail our dependence on foreign oil 
and reap the foreign policy capital from doing so. Rather than conclude 
that most Americans have knowingly signed on to a constitutional sui-
cide pact, I conclude that we lack a public consensus in all but rhetoric 
regarding the risks of terrorism and the costs and benefits of response. 
Finally, while we might contain the threat from this conflict with 
sustained commitment, the jihadist need only get through once with a 
WMD weapon to deeply change the nature of American society-its 
optimism, its humanity, its tolerance, and its sense of liberty. So long as 
there is a supply of young, disgruntled men and women in the world, the 
potential for such an attack will remain. 
There is such a source of future jihadists. Indications are that it is 
growing. Global polls reflect widespread support for jihadists like 
Osama bin Laden. A 2004 Pew Poll reflected bin Laden's enduring 
popularity, with favorable ratings of fifty-five percent in Jordan, sixty-five 
percent in Pakistan, and forty-five percent in Morocco.9 Moreover, the war 
in Iraq has produced at least a generation-the next generation--of 
8. CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, FOREIGN POLICY AND TERRORISM INDEX (2006), available 
at http://www.americanprogress.org/kf/terrorsurveypoll.pdf. 
9. Pew Global Attitudes Project, Nine Nation Survey, Mar. 2004, http://pewglobal. 
org/reports/pdf/206top line. pdf. 
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jihadists, as Afghanistan produced the generation before. The generation 
beyond, one suspects, is at work in madrasahs throughout South Asia 
(and potentially beyond in Africa and the Balkans, depending on where 
Wahabbists and others have set up schools). Moreover, many in the ji-
hadist camp view casualties as martyrs, which encourages rather than 
discourages others from the further pursuit of terrorist means. Before 
September 11, a handful of jihadist websites operated; there are now 
over 5,000. 10 
For these reasons, even if we succeed in deterring attack over time, 
we cannot ever know if we have "won." Nor can we ever assume that we 
have "won" because we cannot ignore a threat that can kill thousands, 
perhaps millions, and potentially undermine our way of life with a single 
successful attack. 
Ill. INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 
If there is room to debate the likelihood of a WMD attack, and I am 
glad to say there is, there is no room to debate the importance of intelli-
gence" in preventing it. Pick your metaphor. Intelligence is the oxygen, 
the blood, or the fuel of counterterrorism. As Marine commander Maj. 
Gen. Dennis Hejlik has said, during previous wars it was easy to find the 
enemy, but hard to kill him. 12 In this conflict, it is hard to find the enemy, 
but easy to kill him. Equally important, intelligence is decisive in identi-
fying fissionable material that is at risk and in severing the enemy from 
potential illicit sources of WMD on the black market. Therefore, it is no 
surprise that many of the critical counterterrorism tools are intelligence 
instruments, including electronic surveillance, rendition, liaison, data-
mining, and covert action. These are also among the most controversial 
security instruments, in part because they can raise difficult policy 
choices as well as difficult legal and legal values questions. 
10. Arnaud de Borchgrave, Iran Scores in World War, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2006, at 
Commentary Page. 
11. When I refer to intelligence I am referring to information relevant to national secu-
rity decisionmaking garnered from certain sources and methods of collection and analysis. 
Thus, "intelligence" describes the source, not necessarily the quality of the information. Gen-
erally speaking, there are five intelligence functions: collection; analysis and dissemination; 
liaison; covert action; and counterintelligence. See IN THE COMMON DEFENSE, supra note *, 
Introduction. 
12. General Hejlik said: "If you look at the way warfare had been in the past, it was 
easy to find the enemy, but hard to finish the enemy because everyone fought en masse. That's 
totally changed. Now it's extremely hard to find the enemy, and relatively easy to finish him." 
See Chip Jones, Special Operations, Special Purpose, MARINE CoRPS NEWS RooM: OcTOBER 
2006 ARCHIVES, Oct. 29, 2006, available at http://www.marine-corps-news.com/2006/IO/. 
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Even if we agree on the nature of the threat and the role of intelli-
gence, commentators are less certain about the role of law and legal 
values in this conflict, or better put, more divided about the role of law. 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson said "the survival of states is not a mat-
ter of law." 13 More recently, commentators have taken to citing Justice 
Jackson's statement that "the Constitution is not a suicide pact."14 The 
presumption is that the law should not be read or applied in a manner 
that restricts national security. If this is true of the Constitution, then it is 
certainly true of international law. 
But law matters. Law enhances national security by improving re-
sults. It is also a security value and not just a liberty value. It is law, for 
example, that distinguishes the manner in which the United States uses 
force from terrorism through adherence to the international legal princi-
ples of discrimination, military objective, proportionality, and necessity. 
The question is not whether law and intelligence should be linked in 
U.S. practice, but how best to apply law to intelligence to advance our 
national security interests and values. 
Law can contribute to the intelligence mission in at least two ways. 15 
I) Substantive Authority: Law provides substantive authority to act, 
and in many cases act boldly. This is true with respect to each of the five 
intelligence functions. The Constitution and statutes provide authority to 
collect and analyze intelligence and counterintelligence, as well as con-
duct liaison and covert action. In Totten, Administrator v. United States, 
an 1875 case involving an effort by the estate of a Union spy to collect 
on a secret contract with President Lincoln, the Supreme Court stated: 
We have no difficulty as to the authority of the President in the 
matter. He was undoubtedly authorized during war, as com-
mander in chief of the armies of the United States, to employ 
secret agents to enter the rebel lines and obtain information re-
specting the strength, resources, and movements of the enemy; 
and contracts to compensate such agents are so far binding upon 
the government as to render it lawful for the President to direct 
payment of the amount stipulated out of the contingent fund un-
der his control. Our objection is not the contract, but to the 
action upon it in the court of Claims. The service stipulated by 
the contract was a secret service; the information sought was to 
13. Dean Acheson, Remarks at the Proceedings of the American Society of Interna-
tional Law, 57th Annual Meeting 13-15 (1963), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL RULES: 
APPROACHES FROM INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 107, 108 (Robert 
J. Beck et al. eds., 1996). 
14. Terminello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. I, 36 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
15. Whether law does so depends on the lawyer, a subject addressed in Part V this Arti-
cle. 
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be obtained clandestinely, and was to be communicated pri-
vately; the employment and the service were equally 
concealed. 16 
Totten remains good law. 17 Statutory law also provides exceptions to fa-
cilitate the performance of these functions, for example exemptions 
pertaining to false visas and false identification. 18 
Totten is a broad statement of presidential authority to conduct intel-
ligence activities. Nonetheless, whatever the scope of the president's 
inherent authority, the president acts at the zenith of his authority when 
he is also acting pursuant to legislative authority. 19 Practitioners-
meaning both lawyers and operatives-may sometimes overlook this 
truism as well as its possible impact on policy and the conduct of intelli-
gence activities. Where the law is clear and is clearly exercised, risk-
taking generally increases. This is true in the field and it is true in Wash-
ington. 
Clear expressions of statutory authority also help to sustain long-
term public support for the intelligence function and some of its neces-
sary, but more controversial missions (of course, where there is clear 
constitutional and statutory authority there may be less overall contro-
versy). Officers who experienced the 1970s, or those who have studied 
that period, will appreciate the importance of generating and sustaining 
public understanding of and support for the intelligence function. It is 
more important now than ever because this is a perpetual conflict and we 
will only succeed in deterring the worst-case scenarios through aggres-
sive use of the intelligence instrument, risk-taking, and the recruitment 
of intellectually and culturally diverse talent. 
(2) Process. In my view, intelligence risk-taking and public confi-
dence is achieved not through public disclosure, but through the 
application of good process that is both secret and accountable. Law, by 
which I mean statutory law and executive directive, can provide essential 
processes for appraising intelligence functions before and after their use. 
To be clear, process can be effective or dysfunctional, or more colloqui-
ally, good or bad. Good process includes key viewpoints and expertise in 
the decision-making chain. Good process drives debate to decision and 
consensus to implementation. Good process permits the management of 
multiple crises at once. In other words, sound process allows policymak-
16. Totten, Adm'r v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 106 (1875). 
17. See Doe v. Tenet, 329 F. 3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2003). 
18. See 18 U.S.C. § 1546 (2000) (Fraud and misuse of visas, permits, and other docu-
ments); 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2000) (Fraud and related activity in connection with identification 
documents and information). 
19. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
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ers and intelligence officers to effectively manage the daily twenty-first 
century national security tableaux. 
Good process is particularly important in the intelligence arena for at 
least four reasons. First, the success or failure of our intelligence effort 
will depend on our success in addressing various risks. We must cali-
brate the risk to our officers and agents in the field in a manner 
commensurate with the threat against which they are collecting. Simi-
larly, we must find and hold an optimum balance between the risk of 
operational penetration and force protection with the necessity of having 
a diverse cultural and language pool from which to draw officers, lin-
guists, and analysts. We must also find the right balance between the 
immediate imperative of identifying and disrupting the threat and the 
risk that in doing so we forego our legal and moral values. In the longer 
run it is these values that will sustain public support at home and our 
alliances abroad, ultimately diminishing the appeal of the opponent. 
Each risk requires a process where leadership can preview operational 
choices at the tactical and strategic level and review results so as to re-
calibrate our risk posture. We need to ask if we have calibrated these 
risks accurately in each context presented, and we must do so on a daily 
basis, not just when there is a real or perceived intelligence failure. 20 
Second, process is essential in any endeavor with the functional and 
bureaucratic scope of the U.S. intelligence mission, and that must cover 
the number and range of human and natural threats to U.S. national secu-
rity. On the bureaucratic side, there are currently sixteen intelligence 
community components. That is the official number; there are many 
more producers and consumers of intelligence if one includes homeland 
security. Homeland security is, after all, the objective of national secu-
rity-the protection of our physical security and the preservation of our 
values. With homeland security, for example, the meat inspector or cus-
toms agent, and not just the case officer or the satellite, may prove the 
critical source of intelligence. If the national security threat comes in 
the form of bird flu, then the private health care professional may be-
come the essential field agent. Consider as well that in San Diego, 
20. The unintended strength of the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, S. 2845, 
108th Cong. (2004), was that while intending to "demote" the Director of Central Intelligence 
or the CIA through the creation of the Directorate of National Intelligence (DNI), the bill in 
fact resulted in a promotion: allowing more attention by the head of the CIA to the daily man-
agement of the complexities and risks associated with human intelligence collection. 
Similarly, there are two unintended weaknesses in the bill. First, the creation of a DNI sug-
gests that bureaucratic and legal adjustments can "fix" rather than facilitate what is ultimately 
a leadership challenge. Second, it creates the impression that the primary intelligence player is 
the DNI, not the president. This is not so. Only the president has the bureaucratic and constitu-
tional wherewithal to fuse all-source intelligence and lead the intelligence community as 
intelligence commander in chief. 
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twenty-eight separate entities have a role in providing for homeland se-
curity. That means that San Diego County alone has twenty-eight 
separate, organizational intelligence producers and consumers.21 In short, 
process is more, not less, important when dealing with homeland secu-
rity, which is organized horizontally across the federal government and 
vertically from national to local government. 
In this regard, the Joint Terrorism Task Force concept and process, 
with parallel state fusion centers, is a homeland security success story.22 
State Department lawyer Ed Cummings used to counsel his team about 
"the importance of being there" at the moment of decision.23 The same 
can be said of the intelligence analyst or warning officer. "The impor-
tance of being there" in the same room cannot be overlooked: analysts 
must see essential information and break down the cultural and personal-
ity barriers that often impede intelligence fusion. 
Third, process also determines whether and when lawyers get in-
volved, which is to say, how law and legal values are applied, if at all, to 
the intelligence functions. This depends not just on legal directives, but 
on senior leaders who respect the law and the role of lawyers, and under-
stand that legal values promote national security policy. Rule of law 
defines who we are. It distinguishes us from our opponents. Leading by 
example (ductus exemplo) allows us to make demands of our allies. 
However, law as a security value is subjective and harder to measure in 
result than the success or failure of steps taken to advance our physical 
security. 
Fourth, where the intelligence function is concerned, external 
mechanisms of appraisal are muted and tempered, if they exist at all. As 
Justice Jackson remarked, "[t]he tendency is strong to emphasize tran-
sient results upon policies ... and lose sight of enduring consequences 
upon the balanced power structure of our Republic."24 Given the legiti-
mate necessity for security and sometimes speed, process takes on added 
importance--opening the aperture wide enough for thoughtful review, 
but not so wide as to risk overexposure. Good process may provide the 
21. David Wood, 'Interoperability' Issue still Bedevils Emergency Response, 
NEWHOUSE NEWS SERV., Mar. 2, 2006, http://www.newhouse.com. 
22. See The FBI Transformation Since 2001: Hearing Before the H. Appropriations 
Subcomm. on Science, the Departments of State. Justice and Commerce, and Related Agen-
cies, 109th Cong. 254-95, 314-33 (2005) (statement of Robert S. Mueller III, Director, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation); Karen De Young, Five Years Later: The Bureaucratic Front: 
a Fight Against Terrorism-and Disorganization, WASH. PosT, Aug. 9, 2006, at A I. 
23. Cummings was a career attorney in the State Department's legal office who headed 
the political-military affairs office for many years. He died of cancer in February 2006. See 
Lawyers and Wars: A Symposium Issue in Honor of Edward R. Cummings, 38 GEO. WASH. 
INT'L L. REv. 493 (2006). 
24. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634. 
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only basis for identifying and evaluating risks and then fixing account-
ability for the policy and intelligence judgments regarding those risks. 
Of course, many national security decisions are close calls. Identifying 
counterviews, if it does not change decisions, may well influence tactics 
in mitigation of those risks. And as I noted earlier, process and account-
ability also increase risk-taking when authority and responsibility are 
clear. 
Without such processes being fixed in law, they might not occur at 
all or may only incorporate certain views. Speed and security would 
likely always carry the day. One of the functions of the intelligence law-
yer is to demonstrate to operatives and policymakers that speed and 
security do not necessarily present a zero-sum equation with process and 
law. Good process leads to better security results. Process embedded in 
law, in tum, is a source of continuity and national security strength. It 
guards against secrecy and sophistry at times of peril and it protects 
policies dependent on long-term commitment from floundering or stray-
ing off course in times of calm. 
Stop to think about it: the majority of framework intelligence laws 
are procedural. This is the case, for example, with two of the most im-
portant intelligence tools: covert action and electronic surveillance (at 
least as authorized in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act).25 The 
present processes for the internal and external appraisal of rendition and 
liaison activities are less evident, but good process is no less important. 
Congress has determined that covert action bears particular policy and 
legal risks, and therefore should be subject to a particular process of re-
view and reporting. Presidents have more or less agreed with, or at least 
acquiesced in, this judgment through executive practice and process. 
However, activities once subject to vigorous review as covert action may 
become "traditional" in the context of a perpetual conflict and thus re-
side outside established processes of review. Similarly, clandestine 
military and intelligence liaison activities historically have received less 
internal preview or review.26 But particularly in a counterterrorism setting 
they raise many of the same policy and legal risks as covert action, in-
cluding the risk of national security failure. Given the importance of 
intelligence, the question is not whether we should engage in these 
25. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), Pub. L. No. 95-511, tit. I, 10 I, 92 
Stat. 1783 (1983) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-11 (1996)). For a discussion of the legal 
arguments for and against an inherent presidential authority, as well as a discussion of the 
legal policy arguments that should inform such a debate, see IN THE CoMMON DEFENSE, supra 
note*, at ch. 5. 
26. James E. Baker, From Cold War to Long War: Covert Action in U.S. Legal Context, 
in 3 STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE 157 (Loch K. Johnson ed., 2007). 
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activities, but what process should be used in approving and appraising 
their use. 
IV. INTE~NATIONAL LAW AND INTELLIGENCE 
International law and intelligence are also conceptually linked. This 
is intuitive. Where the threat is transnational in character, the U.S. re-
sp<:mse should be transnational as well. The United States must 
contextually draw on all the national security instruments to address the 
WMD threat. This includes offensive operations as well as implementa-
tion of a concentric homeland defense. What is perhaps less intuitive to 
intelligence specialists is the degree to which international law is rele-
vant to and can facilitate the intelligence mission. 
Such a statement is easy to turn into a truism depending on how one 
defines "international law." Therefore, rather than define international 
law in a manner that validates my observation, I will use the definition of 
public international law offered to judges by the American Society of 
International Law (ASIL): 
Public international law [is] the law which regulates the inter-
course of nations ... the building blocks of international law, 
broadly understood, include a wide range of activities and re-
gimes beyond treaties, such as domestic statutes with 
extraterritorial application, the transnational coordination of 
regulatory agencies, and the treatment of aliens by foreign gov-
ernments. In sum, today's lawyer is increasingly involved in 
what some commentators have called transnational law, a term 
coined by Phillip Jessup "to include all law which regulates ac-
tions or events that transcend national frontiers." At issue is ... 
the web of legal regimes between and within countries that is the 
result of globalization.27 
This broad definition accurately describes the web of U.S., international, 
and foreign law applicable to the intelligence functions. 
The ASIL definition provides a useful baseline because it transforms 
international law from an abstraction into its component parts. Some of 
these parts are operational and some are distantly aspirational, especially 
where war and peace and human rights are concerned. The definition 
also makes the essential point for intelligence practice that when we talk 
about international law we are really talking about transnational law, not 
a narrow, treaty-based definition of international law. 
27. DAVID BEDERMAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: A HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES 2-3 
(Am. Soc'y of lnt'l Law ed., 2003). 
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This perspective also belies the suspicion that where national secu-
rity is concerned, there is really no such thing as international law so 
much as there is national interest, which may or may not align with in-
ternational law. States ultimately will act in their own interests and not 
out of a sense of international legal obligation. Ndwhere is this instinct 
more ingrained than in the intelligence function. To tum a phrase from 
President Reagan, international law is about trust; national intelligence is 
about verification.28 
But there is no question that transnational law is a critical compo-
nent of the intelligence function. International law can constrain the 
performance of intelligence functions; more likely, it will affect the pol-
icy and legal costs and risks associated with intelligence activities in the 
event of disclosure. However, international law can also serve as a use-
ful, if not essential, national security tool. In these respects, international 
law may be more relevant in today's perilous times than it was before 
September 11. 
Let me suggest a few ways international law can contribute-indeed 
must contribute-if we are to wield the intelligence instrument most ef-
fectively to detect and deter WMD terrorism. I do so not out of some 
blind faith in international law, but out of a sense of national interest, 
which also happens to reflect an international interest in combating ter-
rorism and thus protecting human rights and advancing public order. 
1) Process, Policy, and Permit. First, international law can provide 
the structure and process for the effective collection, sharing, and use of 
intelligence. This is evident in the context of traditional international law 
mechanisms like extradition treaties and Mutual Legal Assistance trea-
ties, which have as their purpose criminal prosecution, but also in the 
terrorism context, the production of intelligence and the disruption of 
terrorist activities. 
Where ordinary mechanisms of extradition are not used, the United 
States and other states practice rendition and extraordinary rendition. In 
U.S. practice, rendition addresses considerations of speed, secrecy, and 
security, while facilitating intelligence collection and the disruption of 
terrorist cells. Rendition also provides cover, or plausible deniability, to 
sending states that may not otherwise want to be seen to assist the 
United States or assume the risk of terrorist retribution. Rendition may 
also be used where the United States has a security or intelligence inter-
est in a subject, but lacks a sufficient basis to detain or prosecute the 
subject himself. 
28. Ronald Reagan often used the adage "trust, but verify." See, e.g., Associated Press, 
Historic Missile Treaty Signed; Leaders Pledge Further Efforts for Arms Control, L.A. nMES, 
Dec. 8, 1987, at AI. 
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Rendition is not a new practice.29 Many of the principles of law de-
bated today derive from the 1960 rendition of Adolf Eichmann,30 the 
1972 Toscanino case,31 and the Yunis line of opinions addressing an ex-
traordinary rendition from Beirut in 1987.32 However, the WMD threat 
has placed new tensidn between the imperative to gather intelligence and 
disrupt attack on the one hand, and America's legal values and the policy 
benefits of espousing those legal values in a clear and committed manner 
on the other hand. It has also led to new tension over the transnational 
legal principles involving self-defense, international humanitarian law 
pertaining to torture and non-refoulement, and state sovereignty. With 
rendition, domestic law, international law, foreign law, and legal policy 
are all at play. 
I have already noted how domestic law can play an important role in 
providing procedures to check and balance the inevitable and appropriate 
intelligence interest in speed, security, and information. Extraordinary 
rendition is an excellent example of a context in which such process is 
vital. Indeed, with rendition, process may determine substance. For ex-
ample, a process that only includes representatives from one agency, or 
from one segment of one agency, will not provide the same depth of per-
29. As noted in the U.S. Attorneys' Manual, an extraordinary rendition may entail no 
more than an effort to lure a suspect from one point to another, or it may amount to what is in 
the eyes of local or foreign law a kidnapping. U.S. DEP'T OF JusTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS' 
MANUAL, § 9-15.000, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/ 
usam/title9/15mcrm.htm#9-15.100. In this sense, policymakers and lawyers might wisely test 
the facts as opposed to their description in evaluating the legal and policy implications of a 
given rendition. Moreover, policymakers and lawyers must also consider that in the course of 
a protracted conflict, the heretofore extraordinary rendition may indeed become ordinary (or 
in covert action parlance, "traditional") without sufficient amendment of operative bureau-
cratic mechanisms prompting interagency or senior level review of those actions raising the 
most difficult policy and legal questions. 
30. The story of the rendition of Adolf Eichmann from the streets of Buenos Aires to a 
Jerusalem courtroom has been cited dozens of times. See, e.g., Helen Silving, In re Eichmann: 
A Dilemma of Law and Morality, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 307 (1961). The resulting trial can be 
found at CA 336/61 Eichmann v. Attorney Gen. [1962] lsrSC 16(3) 2033, reprinted in 36 
I.L.R. 277 (1968). 
31. In United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974), an accused drug smug-
gler was abducted from Uruguay and transported to Brazil, where he was interrogated and 
tortured in the presence of U.S. agents prior to being brought into U.S. federal court. The 
Second Circuit held that due process required a court to divest itself of jurisdiction over the 
person of a defendant where it had been acquired as the result of the government's deliberate, 
unnecessary, and unreasonable invasion of the accused's constitutional rights. 
32. Fawaz Yunis, a citizen of Lebanon, was suspected of being involved in the 1985 
hijacking of a Jordanian airliner that had American passengers on board. Yunis escaped after 
all hostages were released and the plane was destroyed. In 1987, U.S. agents located Yunis and 
lured him into international waters off the coast of Cyprus. They then forcefully returned him, 
via U.S. naval ships and aircraft, to the United States on charges of hostage-taking and aircraft 
piracy. The federal district court for the District of Columbia allowed his prosecution under 
the 1988 Hostage Taking Act. United States v. Yunis, 859 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
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spective as an interagency process that includes at least a devil's advo-
cate to test operational assumptions, the potential for mistaken identity, 
and the policy value or legal necessity for assurances. In Justice Jack-
son's words, the immediate will be stressed over the long term.33 Where 
the government's internal process is agency specific, it is the lawyers 
who have the specific responsibility to ensure that considerations of legal 
policy are tested and factual assumptions about identity and assurances 
validated. 
International law can also provide procedural checks and balances 
that at the same time advance speed and security in rendition practice. 
Where there are agreements in place on the process of rendition, for ex-
ample, transfers can be made in a timely manner without the necessity 
for negotiation over assurances, access, or intelligence. The United 
Kingdom has concluded such a public agreement with Jordan.34 Other 
agreements may be secret. By further example, there is indication that a 
key actor in the July 2005 London bombings, which killed fifty-two 
people, was the subject of a rendition request from the United States be-
fore the attack, but that the sending state balked out of concern that the 
United States would not treat the subject in a manner which in the view 
of the sending state was consistent with international law. Regularized 
process, documented in an overt or clandestine binding agreement, can 
address such concerns in advance and facilitate timely intelligence col-
lection when it matters most. 
Similarly, international law can facilitate liaison relationships gener-
ally. Where agreements are in place, we do not have to reinvent the 
wheel. Tried and agreed mechanisms can maximize speed and secrecy 
while minimizing the qualitative risks of receiving intelligence from un-
known sources with unknown agendas and unknown records. 
This is also true in the case of mechanisms like the Proliferation Se-
curity Initiative (PSI). The PSI is a political agreement between like-
minded states regarding principles and processes for identifying and 
boarding maritime vessels and aircraft of proliferation concern. While 
the PSI chapeau is nonbinding, the United States has used the PSI as an 
umbrella under which to conclude a number of bilateral ship-boarding 
agreements with maritime flag states. From the perspective of national 
security process, I like to think of the PSI as a Global PD-27, the 1978 
presidential directive that still governs U.S. interagency process for ad-
dressing non-military incidents, including maritime interdictions. As an 
33. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952). 
34. Memorandum of Understanding Regulating the Provision of Undertakings in Re-
spect of Specified Persons Prior to Deportation, U.K.-Jordan, Aug. 10,2005,44 I.L.M. 1511, 
available at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2005/aug/uk-jordan-MOU.pdf. 
654 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 28:639 
intelligence matter, I like to think of the PSI as essentially a functional 
liaison agreement. 
Here, international law is providing a process that in theory will ex-
pedite decision at moments of crisis. If the predicate intelligence proves 
unfounded we will have acted in accord with agreed principles, and 
states should be no less inclined to share intelligence with us the next 
time around. But it is a nascent regime that is relatively untested. More-
over, I confess to engaging in some optimism bias of my own. 
What I would like to see is the PSI, and more broadly nonprolifera-
tion, elevated to the top of the national security agenda and given the 
same surge of energy and anger that has driven the United States to con-
clude Article 98 agreements with parties to the International Criminal 
Court. The threat of WMD terrorism warrants such treatment. Consider 
as well the importance of regular process in transmitting passenger lists 
pursuant to air travel agreements, financial transactions, and the place-
ment of technical and human monitors at foreign ports. Each is a product 
of transnational law, for which the same arguments apply, mutatis mu-
tandis, to the PSI. 
Nor should we overlook the fact that much of our nonproliferation 
information is derived through international law, including through 
IAEA mechanisms that are a product of verification agreements con-
cluded pursuant to Article IV of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (NPT).35 As Iran and North Korea have demonstrated, 
international law, in this case in the form of a treaty, bears no guarantees 
of compliance. Even worse, the NPT provides a degree of cover to Iran 
by validating the right to peaceful nuclear energy and the capacity to 
generate it. But the NPT is a window, in some cases the only window 
into nuclear proliferation in states of concern. 
There is perhaps no more transparent example of the link between 
international law and intelligence than the relationship between U.S. 
maritime security and agreements established through the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO). Recall that U.S. law requires inbound 
vessels to provide ninety-six hours' notice before arriving in U.S. ports 
and to identify on their manifests the five prior ports of cal1.36 Vessels are 
also required to have security plans and security officers and to install 
Automated Identification Systems, which are basically "identification 
friend or foe" transponders for vessels on the high seas. These require-
ments and processes derive from the 2004 amendments to the Safety of 
35. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons art. IV, opened for signature 
July I, 1968,21 U.S.T. 483,729 U.N.T.S. 161. 
36. Ports and Waterways Safety, 33 C.F.R. §§ 160.1-160.215 (2006). 
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Life at Sea Treaty (SOLAS), concluded under the auspices of the IM0.37 
In short, international law provides both a mechanism (the IMO) and a 
vehicle (SOLAS) to accomplish the intelligence goal-maritime domain 
awareness. 
The United States might have imposed sucli requirements on its 
own, but as with nonproliferation and sanctions regimes generally, the 
concept only works if the costs are shared and the restrictions are uni-
form in application. Otherwise, the U.S. maritime industry would find 
itself in a costly commercial prisoner's dilemma with only marginal se-
curity benefit. The approximately 7,500 foreign flagged vessels that visit 
U.S. ports each year would remain outside the regime, while the 9,500 
registered American vessels, which arguably pose the least U.S. security 
risk, would assume the cost of compliance. The IMO and the Govern-
ment Accountability Office both report only partial compliance due to 
the cost involved, among other factors. 38 Moreover, we can be sure that 
some vessels will not comply, a group that will obviously include ships 
engaged in illicit traffic. Nevertheless, we should not overlook the bene-
fit of even partial compliance to maritime domain awareness, changing 
the number of vessels approaching the U.S. coast that might fall into the 
"high interest" board category, or warranting the placement of a Sea 
Marshal on the bridge when entering the approaches to a U.S. port. Here 
again, the aphorism rings true: trust, but verify. 
2) National Security Policy. International law fosters good intelli-
gence in two additional ways. First, the principles embodied in 
international law are often good national security policy and not just 
"law." Where the United States acts or is perceived to act in a manner 
consistent with international law, it is more likely to receive transna-
tional support, including intelligence support from like-minded 
governments. 
Milt Beardon, a renowned CIA case officer, illustrates the connec-
tion through graphic reference to Soviet pilots during their war in 
Afghanistan.39 Beardon recounts seeing a picture of a Soviet pilot who 
committed suicide upon parachuting to the ground rather than risk cap-
ture by the Mujahedeen. Beardon subsequently persuaded his Afghan 
contacts to treat captured Soviet pilots humanely, by which he meant in 
accord with the principles of the Geneva Conventions. He did so out of a 
37. International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, opened for signature Nov. I, 
1974,32 U.S.T. 47, 1184 U.N.T.S. 2 (amended 2004). 
38. See generally Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MARITIME SECURITY: SUBSTAN-
TIAL WORK REMAINS TO TRANSLATE NEW PLANNING REQUIREMENTS INTO EFFECTIVE PORT 
SECURITY (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04838.pdf. 
39. Milt Bearden, When the C.I.A. Played by the Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2005, at 
A27. 
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sense of legal obligation and in hopes of generating reciprocal treatment, 
but also because it might lead to better intelligence. Sure enough, 
Beardon recounts, some captured Soviet pilots who were treated hu-
manely were in due course induced to defect to the intelligence 
advantage of the United States and the Mujahedeen. I am not suggesting 
that if I were to parachute into Taliban territory today I would receive 
gracious treatment. I am suggesting that international law often reflects 
good national security policy along with good legal policy. 
The converse is also true: where the United States acts, or is per-
ceived to act, outside international law, it may receive less intelligence 
support. Consider the above example of the 2005 London bombings and 
the delay in the rendition of a critical subject. Consider as well the reac-
tion to a purported rendition from Milan, Italy,40 and the confmned 
renditions of Maher Aher41 and Khaled al Masri.42 Although I cannot 
demonstrate so empirically, I think it is fair to say that these cases have 
not improved or facilitated future intelligence cooperation and sharing 
with the countries in question. The State Department Legal Adviser has 
suggested as much.43 The damage to U.S. public diplomacy from these 
cases is certainly disproportionate to the intelligence gained. 
International law can also provide a framework for aggressive intel-
ligence operations, such as those conducted pursuant to a lawful right of 
self-defense. Consider the decision of President Clinton to authorize Af-
ghan tribals to kill or capture Osama bin Laden in the 1990s. As a matter 
of law, this decision was predicated on a determination by relevant law-
yers-before the 1998 embassy bombings-that the United States might 
lawfully kill bin Laden and his lieutenants as a matter of self-defense. In 
terms of process, this judgment was initiated by lawyers and was predi-
cated on a factual briefing by CIA experts on the al Qaeda threat. 
Moreover, the change in legal paradigm from a law enforcement model 
to one based on the law of armed conflict applied equally to intelligence 
operations executed through clandestine assets as well as overt military 
means like cruise missiles. 
However, this example also illustrates that transnational law con-
strains as well as permits intelligence operations. Let me give you three 
examples drawn from different applications of transnational law, involv-
40. See Ian Fisher & Elisabetta Povoledo, Italy Seeks Indictments of C.I.A. Operatives 
in Egyptian's Abduction, N.Y. TiMES, Dec. 6, 2006, atAI2. 
41. See Ian Austen, Canada Will Pay $9.75 Million to Man Sent to Syria and Tortured, 
N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 27, 2007, at AS. 
42. See Colin Nickerson, Germany Issues Warrant for 13 CIA Operatives, BosTON 
GLOBE, Feb. I, 2007, atA3. 
43. Craig Whitlock, Testimony Helps Detail CIA's Post-9111 Reach; Europeans Told of 
Plans for Abductions, WASH. PosT, Dec. 16,2006, at AI. 
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ing U.S. criminal law, treaty law, and foreign law. When President Clin-
ton authorized U.S. forces and contacts to attack bin Laden, he did so in 
a manner that was consistent with the law of armed conflict as it was 
understood to be implemented in U.S. criminal law at the time.44 Thus, 
the President's authorization included instruction that if bin Laden or his 
lieutenants surrendered or were captured, they were to be treated hu-
manely, that is, not executed or tortured (acts prohibited by international 
law as implemented in U.S. criminal law). 
International treaties may also raise the costs and consequences of 
conduct, at least if that conduct is discovered or disclosed. One illustra-
tion is the 1983 mining of Nicaraguan harbors and subsequent litigation 
in the International Court of Justice.45 As referenced earlier, foreign law 
has also come into play in a number of rendition contexts. Certain coun-
tries are now effectively operationally off-limits to U.S. intelligence 
actors who have correctly or incorrectly been identified in relation to 
events occurring in those countries. One is also reminded of the Rainbow 
Warrior incident and the prosecution of French intelligence agents in 
New Zealand.46 More recently, diplomatic relations between Israel and 
New Zealand were strained when two alleged Mossad agents were 
prosecuted for trying to obtain New Zealand passports with false identi-
ties.47 The incident underscores the fact that the application of foreign 
law to national intelligence activities is not solely a U.S. consideration, 
but is endemic to the function. A meaningful process of preview will 
identify and weigh the application of transnational law, including the 
availability of alternative means or mitigating measures to address or 
diminish such risks. 
3) Intelligence and the Law. As law may shape the conduct of intel-
ligence, intelligence also shapes the law. I have described how 
transnational law can facilitate and in some cases constrain the intelli-
gence functions. The two are also linked in a third critical manner: 
44. As a matter of policy, the President expressed a preference that bin Laden be cap-
tured rather than killed. 
45. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27). 
46. The Rainbow Warrior was a boat operated by Greenpeace and had traveled to the 
South Pacific in 1985 to protest nuclear testing in French Polynesia by the Government of 
France. On July 10, while the boat was docked in Auckland harbor, agents from the French 
foreign intelligence service affixed explosive devices to the ship's hull and detonated them, 
sinking the boat. One crew member was killed. Two French agents were caught, tried, and 
imprisoned. See New Zealand Police, Rainbow Warrior Bombing, http://www.police.govt. 
nz/operation/wharf/. See generally DOUGLAS PORCH, THE FRENCH SECRET SERVICES 459-60 
(1995). 
47. Frozen Ttes on Low Flame, Despite Diplomatic Sanctions, FIN. TiMES (London), 
Dec. 2, 2004. 
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intelligence and intelligence capacity shape international law, particu-
larly with respect to the use of force. 
Whether international lawyers like it or not, the threat of WMD ter-
rorism, and in particular nuclear terrorism, has transformed the manner 
in which the U.S. government views self-defense. On a tactical level, the 
PSI is an effort to shape the law through customary practice and provide 
a process for doing so. On a strategic level, the preemption doctrine is 
also an effort to shape international law in a manner that accounts for the 
inability to determine factually the moment at which the threat of WMD 
terrorism is imminent. 
Once obtained by terrorists, WMD is particularly difficult to locate. 
As a result, there is understandable pressure to apply existing doctrines 
of law in a manner that permits the use of force against nascent and po-
tential threats or, alternatively, to reshape the law to permit the use of 
force before WMD threats cross the line of confirmed imminence. This 
tension between traditional concepts of imminence and the inchoate na-
ture of the WMD threat was first seen in U.S. practice with the cruise 
missile strikes against the al Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum, 
Sudan, in 1998. In doctrine and practice, this tension arose anew in the 
promulgation of the so-called "preemption doctrine" and in the 2003 
invasion of Iraq. It is also clear that other states have considered the 
same tension between traditional legal concepts and the incapacity of 
intelligence to detect the moment of imminent threat, as did Israel prior 
to the 1981 Osirak airstrike. 
In the cases of al Shifa and Iraq,48 the decision to use force was 
based on intelligence judgments about the risk of WMD falling into ter-
rorist hands. The legal determinations regarding the use of force hinged 
on intelligence judgments as well. Three immediate conclusions follow. 
First, lawyers who make judgments about the resort to force and the 
means and methods used need to understand intelligence-its strengths, 
limitations, and its distinctions from "evidence." Second, the ability to 
engage in anticipatory self-defense or preemption depends on intelli-
gence capacity. Thus, to the extent these concepts reflect international 
law, it is law that favors states with robust intelligence capacity. Third, 
legal evaluation of U.S. actions to preempt terrorism will turn in large 
measure on the validity of our intelligence judgments. This means that 
where anticipatory force is used, policymakers and intelligence officials 
should feel increased pressure to show at least part of their intelligence 
hand in order to make their legal case. 
48. In the case of Iraq, U.S. lawyers argued that the United States possessed a right to 
use force based on Iraq's material violation of the Gulf War ceasefire. However, in policy 
presentation it is clear that President Bush was advancing a theory of preemption. 
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V. DUTY OF THE INTELLIGENCE LAWYER 
An intelligence lawyer told me a story, perhaps apocryphally, about 
meeting a lawyer from the KGB at the end of the Cold War. In an effort 
to find common ground, he asked the KGB officer about the nature of 
his work and the number of lawyers at the KGB. The KGB lawyer re-
sponded, "Two: one to handle pay and one to handle retirement." 
Apocryphal or not, the story raises a number of questions regarding 
the role of the intelligence lawyer in U.S. practice. How should the law-
yer define her role? Should the lawyer play a passive or active role? 
Should the lawyer engage on operational matters, or stay within a "tradi-
tional" legal lane of contracts, personnel law, and Freedom of 
Information Act litigation? If the lawyer does engage, should interna-
tional law factor in her analysis consistently, or only if it is implemented 
in U.S. law? Finally, should the lawyer provide legal policy input, or 
limit her advice to the law? 
In my view, consideration of these questions starts with recognition 
of the source of the lawyer's duty: the Constitution. Intelligence lawyers, 
like other government lawyers, take an oath to the Constitution, not the 
president and not the agency concerned. In the case of "officers" in a 
constitutional sense, this is a product of constitutional law. In the case of 
inferior officers or employees, it is a product of statute.49 But here we get 
to the human factor: what part of the Constitution will the intelligence 
lawyer emphasize-those sections addressed to security, liberty, or both? 
The practice of intelligence law is either very easy or very difficult. 
The lawyer may choose to play a passive role. Buttressed by principles 
of security and compartments, the lawyer may wait for issues to arise. 
Using this approach, the lawyer may well find legal issues limited to 
questions of retirement and benefits. Or, he may choose a role similar to 
the mafia consigliere: advising how to stay out of trouble, always getting 
to "yes" while offering secret advice and sometimes secret sophistry. 
Finally, the lawyer may play an active role, guiding policymakers and 
operatives to preferred outcomes, recognizing that law-including inter-
national law-can be a positive national security policy value. 
I hope I have not set up too much of a straw man. For in fact, I think 
the answer is contextual. Part of the practice of intelligence law is under-
standing how to triage the work. That means that if the lawyer wants to 
maintain credibility, she cannot make a federal case out of every issue. 
Nonetheless, it is obvious that I favor an active role for the intelligence 
lawyer, because I believe in both the law and in returning to the predicate 
threat. I believe good process is a product of good law, and that good 
49. See IN THE COMMON DEFENSE, supra note*, at ch. 10. 
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process results in better intelligence, which results in better national se-
curity. Moreover, in my experience, it is the lawyer who is best situated 
to uphold both. That is the lawyer's constitutional duty. 
In the context of today's threat, intelligence officers and the officials 
who set intelligence policy, up to the policymaker in chief, have a duty to 
push the intelligence envelope and to push it hard. Do not lose sight of 
the threat: a nuclear attack on a major American city. However, this 
means speed, secrecy, and immediate short-term security benefits will be 
emphasized at the policy table. In this procedural context, the lawyer is 
an essential role player. The lawyer may be the only actor aware of ap-
plicable procedural requirements or the only actor who can identify the 
legal policy risks and benefits associated with conduct as well as the na-
tional security policy benefits they bear. 
This is a tough job. In intelligence law, it is easy to get to "yes." It is 
much harder to guide to "yes" while at the same time maximizing poten-
tially competitive legal policy values. To begin, the lawyer must first be 
at the table, which is no small feat in a secret and compartmented world. 
Once at the table, the lawyer must hold his or her position. The table is 
also a lonely place. This may be literally true; perhaps only one lawyer is 
granted access to the details of the problem or stationed with the compo-
nent in question and thus must make the threshold legal calls alone. It is 
also lonely because, more often than not in the intelligence context, the 
lawyer may find she alone has the mission of playing the skunk, or at 
least a duty to play the skunk if no one else does, because she is an offi-
cer of the court, or in this case the Constitution. Some may think the 
lawyer is more the devil than the devil's advocate. 
The national security bus is also a difficult bus to hail, and if neces-
sary, to stop. Where lives are at stake, guidance may be perceived as an 
obstacle, process as delay. It is also human nature to identify with the 
mission and the team. Lawyers enter this field in part because they be-
lieve in the national security mission. In. this area, lawyers also know that 
if they say "no," their advice may result in the loss of critical intelligence 
or an opportunity to capture or kill a terrorist. Some lawyers bend under 
such pressure or find refuge in secret and Delphic advice. The key is not 
to lose sight of the lawyer's role and duty in doing so-to guide to "yes," 
but if necessary to say "no," and to do so in a manner consistent with 
American legal values, while distinguishing between the law and legal 
policy. 
The lawyer has a number of mitigating options. First is to remember 
that the oath of service is to the Constitution and that the Constitution 
protects security and liberty. Second, it never hurts to explain to the poli-
cymaker how the law relates to good legal and national security policy 
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rather than offering lectures on Grotius. Third, the lawyer should never 
give the operative or policymaker a reason to exclude the lawyer and 
therefore the law. Never leak. Identify deadlines and never miss them. 
And never go home. Practice endurance. Alternatively, be there when it 
counts by knowing in what forum and at what time decisions are made 
and not just recorded. 
Fourth, the lawyer must move the problem up or out. Good process 
tests and evaluates, but also moves issues to authoritative and timely 
points of decision. Otherwise, action officers have incentive to take is-
sues off-track, where decisions can be made rapidly, in part because 
certain views or agencies can be avoided. This is true of national security 
law as well. If the facts are not established, the lawyer should fix them or 
engage an official who can, like the Director of National Intelligence. If 
the law is uncertain, or critical actors divided, the lawyer should move 
the question to an authoritative level of resolution and judgment, like the 
attorney general or the president. 
Fifth, lawyers should return to appraise their legal work just as poli-
cymakers should return to appraise the efficacy of policy and the 
intelligence options taken. Do procedures that appear logical in law, with 
exceptions and waivers, nonetheless result in unintended cultural effects 
for those responsible for their implementation in the field? Has the 
president's directive been implemented in the manner intended, or has it 
lost its meaning along the way, as in the game of telephone? Have the 
instructions been interpreted as a Marine infantry officer would read 
them, or with the caution of a government bureaucrat numbed to over-
sight and investigation, and which did the president intend? 
Finally, in the end it is also useful to remember that, like intelli-
gence, law ultimately depends on the human factor. The law can 
facilitate intelligence collection and activities, with incentives and au-
thorities, but ultimately it depends on the asset who betrays, the analyst 
who evaluates, and a president who leads. Law is also a human endeavor. 
Good law can encourage process and accountability. But while we may 
be a nation of laws, in intelligence practice the law depends on the moral 
integrity and sense of duty of the lawyer on the line who dares to enter 
the decision-making ring and then calls it as he or she sees it. 
